Theist v Atheist

I have been exploring some argument for and against theism and atheism in my biweekly columns at EveryJoe. Unfortunately, the constraints of time and patience do not allow me to state each argument at length, and so, as a gift to my readers, I here publish some of the discussion that did not see print. Make of it what you will.

The strongest argument in favor of one model over another is how much it explained, how clearly, without recourse to special pleading, lapses in logic, or ad hoc. I propose that while the Christian religion contains mysteries certain to daze even the most patient of theologians, it is nonetheless the more robust, on the grounds that it requires fewer assumptions and leaves far less unexplained. For the atheist, nearly everything his worldview seeks to explain is left unexplained, marked off with a mere somehow.

While it is possible (in that it is not a logical self contradiction) that we live in a universe where irrational and non-deliberate chemical and evolutionary processes gave rise to creatures like ourselves capable of reason and deliberation, and that our reason somehow is able to deduce and predict correctly some of the processes of that material universe as well as the imponderable truths of logic, aesthetics, law and ethics, which just so happen somehow to apply to and work inside the material universe as well, it requires a leap of faith to believe that this is the case here in the real universe in which we actually live.

Where is the proof that the real universe behaves in this way?

Where is even a single example?

We have never seen any irrational process lead to a rational result, nor any non deliberate process give rise to a deliberate conclusion, and so our assumption that this somehow happened in the past rests on no evidence, and involves a seeming paradox of something arising from nothing, the paradox of beauty coming from randomness, of ethics springing from remorseless Darwinian struggles to survive, of logic and science arising from unintentional by products of brain chemistry.

And somehow, nearly every human being who has ever lived has had a joy for music and a fear of ghosts, two things which Darwinian selection could not possibly select into existence.

What natural process made it so that natural processes derive order out of chaos without any intention of creating order is also an unanswered somehow.

You see, even if it were true that Darwinian evolution creates order out of disorder (it is not), the question of how Darwinian evolution came to have this property, who or what makes evolution be something that creates order out of disorder, is not answered by the atheist worldview. The atheist must either dismiss the question as unanswerable because it is beyond human knowledge, or must dismiss the question as unanswerable because it is incoherent conceptually, that is, not a real question (like asking how far up is ‘up’?). That dismissal is yet another somehow, a thing the model does not explain.

It would not be an act of faith for any atheist who had seen an irrational primate evolve into a man to believe that order can arise from disorder. Indeed, even seeing a designed system like a computer be engineered into having self awareness and a moral sense would affirm that the hypothesis of order from chaos were reasonable because he would have some reason to believe it were possible. None have ever seen such a thing. As it is, the atheist walks by faith, not by sight.

The assumption that human reason comes from a rational creature, a rational divine creature with a mind, who designed us deliberately to be rational like himself is a less paradoxical assumption, and does not contain the dubious somehows mentioned above. God himself is dubious, the king of somehow, but the explanation of how and why these other things arose becomes coherent granting this doubtful assumption.

And, indeed, the incomprehensible axiom in the theist model concerns a being alleged to be incomprehensible, which is an assumption less vulnerable to skeptical question than the atheist model.

The atheist model requires the assumption that fundamental things we know about human and animal nature, such as that we have free will where animals do not, are merely gross illusions, bewilderingly universe. It is the greater coherency of the theorem which makes it the more reasonable of the two.

Let us turn to specific arguments to show this greater coherency.

Below I make seven arguments. The first argument is divided into four lemmas.

Let us define the word Natural to refer to any events taking place inside the continuum of time and space due to cause-and-effect, that is, necessary efficient causes. Supernatural is anything that cannot be defined solely in terms of events taking place inside the continuum of time and space due to cause-and-effect, that is, necessary efficient causes.

The first argument is ontological, that is, it seeks to show that the nature of being itself is such that it cannot be explained absent a  creator who is supernatural, uncaused, and necessary.

The first lemma is about the nature of time and space:

1. Time exists and has a definite nature and property.
2. Time either came into existence by a natural process, or did not.
3. Time cannot have come into existence by a natural process that took time to complete, by definition.
4. Therefore time either has always existed, or it came into existence by a supernatural act.
5. If time always existed, then there is no event which defined its nature, which is absurd. Therefore time did not always exist.
6. Therefore time came into existence by a supernatural act.

A simpler way to state the same argument, assuming the standard model of physics is true: So, while the Big Bang is itself a natural event, it cannot be said to have arisen from natural causes, that is, causes inside the ambit of time and space, simply because time and space arose from and during the Big Bang. Since the Big Bang created time, whatever brought the Big Bang into being could not be inside time, and could not be a natural cause. Another type of causation is needed, and the only alternative is supernatural causation.

One we conclude that a supernatural act rather than a natural one created time, the definition of supernatural requires us to conclude that this creation was not necessitated by cause-and-effect, as there can be no cause-and-effect outside time. This does not mean there are no events, it merely means no events necessitated by cause and effect. The only thing in human experience akin to this is an act of free will. Hence the event of creation was an act of free will, or something akin to it.

One cannot have a will without a willer, that is, a rational entity, who made specific decisions about the nature of the continuum thus created. Since this entity or entities has the power to create the universe and define their contents, including its laws of nature, laws of matter, and laws of morality, it is reasonable to call him God, since that is what all men know that word to mean.

The second lemma is about the nature of nature:

1. The sum total of natural processes we call ‘nature’ that is, the whole material universe in motion from atoms to stars, exists and has a definite nature. Nature taken as a whole acts in one way and not in another.
2. Nature taken as a whole cannot have caused itself, since nothing causes itself.
3. Nor can nature taken as a whole have a natural cause inside nature, since the part cannot be the cause of the whole.
4. Therefore the cause of the whole of nature is supernatural. And this all men know to be God, for the reasons given above.

The third lemma is about infinite regress:

1. In nature, all events have causes.
2. It is impossible that any natural chains of events have no first cause, or else there is no defined chain of cause and effect.
3. Therefore for every chain of causes and effect, there must be an first cause, which is itself uncaused.
4. Since this uncaused first cause must exist, and cannot be natural, therefore it is supernatural. And this all men know to be God, for the reasons given above.

The fourth lemma is about necessity and contingency:

Definition: A contingent fact is something that can conceivably be the other way: I can imagine the sun rising in the West without any logical contradictions. But no one can conceive a situation where the axioms and common notions of Euclid are true, and the Pythagorean Theorem is false. These are necessarily the case, if the axioms are true.

Common notion: all contingencies are dependent on a logically prior necessity. Example: the sun cannot rise in the east if there is no such thing as motion. The contingent fact of the sun rising in the east logically depends on the truth of the concept of motion. But the concept of motion depends in turn on the concept of time, which is a prior and more fundamental notion. Hence motion is contingent on time, whereas sunrise is contingent on (among other things) motion. Time is contingent on the concept of self identity, since if the statement A is A were false, the concept of time could not be true. The concept of self-identity is dependent on the concept of identity, that is, being qua being. Such is an example of the chain of contingency.

1. In nature, all contingencies are dependent on a logically prior necessity, which in turn is dependent on a higher logically prior necessity, forming a chain of contingency.
2. There can be no infinite chain of contingencies, for it there is no first being, nothing in the chain is defined.
3. Ergo, there must be one necessary being on which all contingent beings depend, itself dependant on no prior necessity.
4. Since this necessary being must exist, and cannot be natural, it is supernatural. And this all men know to be God, for the reasons given above.

Such is my first argument, divided here into four heads.

I here give additional arguments showing the weakness of the atheist worldview.

Second, the argument from law.

1. There are manmade laws we all know to be unjust.
2. If there is no supernatural order, there can be no supernatural lawgiver.
3. Absent a supernatural lawgiver, there is no law with universal authority to overrule manmade law. Likewise, absent a supernatural lawgiver, the conscience has no authority to overrule manmade law.
4. If there is no law with authority to overrule manmade law, manmade law cannot be justly overruled, and hence cannot be unjust.
5. Which is contradicts the first assumption, hence is absurd. Therefore, QED.

Third, the argument from logic.

1. If there is no supernatural order deliberately to design human reason to follow the reason of the universe, the forms of logic which exist in the human mind are either manmade (that is, a construction of his own devising) or natural (an inherited property of his brain structure).
2. If logic is manmade, men could change or abolish the rules of logic at will, in which case all reasoning is in vain.
3. If logic is an inherited property of the brain structure, there is no reason to suppose that logic is objective, or reflects anything in reality, in which case all reasoning is in vain.
4. If all reasoning is in vain, then so is the reasoning in this argument, which is a self-contradiction, hence absurd. Therefore, QED.

This has a corollary in an argument from free will

1. If there is no supernatural order, then there is nothing outside nature.
2. If nothing outside nature, then nothing exists aside from natural processes, matter in motion.
3. Ergo thinking is merely one more natural process like any other, whose outcome is determined by the previous vectors of matter in motion.
4. If so, then no decision (not even the decision to foreswear belief in free will) is decided or even influenced by you.
5. Which is a self-contradiction, hence absurd. Therefore, QED.

Fourth, the argument from beauty:

1. Absent a supernatural order, there are no standards of beauty possible aside from natural standards, which includes only either individual tastes, or culturally determined tastes, or tastes based on instinctive reaction programmed by evolution into our brain chemistry.
2. The common experience of mankind shows that certain things, including those dangerous or indifferent to any possible Darwinian survival trait, such as beholding stars or storms at sea, desert canyons, snowy mountains, horses in full career, images of the rings of Saturn, and on and on, are universally seen as sublime.
3. If such natural beauty is dangerous or indifferent to any possible Darwinian survival trait, then this taste cannot be based on instinctive reaction programmed by evolution into our brain chemistry.
4. Again, if universal, then this taste cannot be personal taste nor culturally determined tastes.
5. Therefore, QED

As a coda, one might mention that neither do musical melodies exist in nature at all, hence could not have influenced Darwinian evolution in any way. But there is no human culture, no, not one, which lacks the love of musical melody.

Fifth, the argument from philanthropy:

1. Law is based on awarding each man his due dignity and right, his by mere fact of being human, neither granted by the fiat of a sovereign nor earned by a test of intelligence or strength.
2. But no one grants another such dignity except to his brother, who needs no grant nor earning to be one’s brother.
3. Hence, universal law is possible when and only when all men are brothers. Civilization, including such delightful pastimes as speculations of philosophy and theology, is not possible unless universal law orders the manmade law, hence civilization is not possible unless all men are brothers.
4. Either all men are brothers, in which case they are due the dignity one offers a brother, or not.
5. Absent a supernatural order, all man cannot literally be brothers. They are instead members of different races and tribes in a Darwinian competition with each other for scarce resources. While temporary accommodations and truces are possible, brotherly love is inappropriate, because, in fact, all men are not brothers.
6. Hence, since all men are not brothers, it is illogical and inappropriate to award all men equal dignity and equal rights, whereupon civilization is without justification, including the civilized courtesy which alone allows this conversation to take place.
7. Therefore anyone who rebut this argument, or even grants it the civilized courtesy of a hearing, tacitly repudiates the preconditions of all argument, which is absurd, therefore QED.

Sixth, the argument from physics:

1. Unlike Alchemy, physics cannot be an untrue nor meaningless discipline, for if it were, airplanes would not fly, electricity would not flow, and bridges would not stand. The common experience of mankind is that the discipline of physics is not in vain.
2. Cause and effect is a precondition without which the discipline of physics is meaningless. Likewise, the regularity of phenomenon is a precondition without which the discipline of physics is meaningless.
3. No discipline can prove its own preconditions. Hence, causality and regularity are not deductions of physics, nor of any empirical study. These axioms must come before physics, hence are rightly called metaphysical.
4. These metaphysical ideas of causality and regularity are nonmaterial, imponderable, occupy neither time nor space, and, in a word, are purely mental abstractions. They do not exist inside the natural order of the material universe.
5. If there is no supernatural order, then metaphysical ideas of causality and regularity do not exist at all, whereupon all metaphysics hence all physics is in vain.
6. Which contradicts the first assumption, hence is absurd, hence QED.

The Seventh argument is an appeal to historical reality.

1. Most men for most of time have believed in a supernatural order. This belief is not only peculiar, for most of them, it was central to their lives and their cultures, even to the point where they were willing to kill and die for it.
2. The belief is either wholly false (as the atheist would have it) or is not wholly false (the Catholic Church teaches that the pagan religions were dim but honest attempts to reach a supernatural reality, hence that they were incomplete, misguided, or inchoate, partly false, but not wholly so).
3. If it is wholly false, then all religious men whatsoever are either lunatics, who believe in something more preposterous and easier to disprove than a belief in invisible giant flying spaghetti monsters, or abominable cowards, playing along with the preposterous Pastaferians despite the self evident absurdity and wickedness of these beliefs.
4. Likewise, if wholly false, then all atheist men are the sole men free of this nearly universal and dangerous lunacy. Freed from the bonds of priest-craft and superstition, we would expect to find atheists outnumbering theists in the areas noted for intellectual honesty and brightness of wit.
5. But if not wholly false, we would expect to find all men to be sinners, and indeed to find sinners up to and including Judas or the Antichrist highly placed in the Church; and to find not all pagans lacking in virtue; nor for that matter all atheists.
6. Even a passing glance at the history of mankind shows that those who believed in the supernatural order were not only not all lunatics, but include the greatest genius and heroes of all time, and the most generous of saints and more fearless of martyrs.
7. Even a passing glance at the history of intellectuals from Rousseau to Nietzsche to Marx to Ayn Rand show them to have violated the common decency and moral code of mankind, sometimes egregiously so, and possessed of less intellectual honesty than the norm.
8. Ergo some extraordinary explanation is needed to explain how famous theists can be afflicted by a lunacy as stupid as pasta-worship, but still be equal or superior to the enlightened atheists in moral and intellectual and all other forms of accomplishment.
9. If no such extraordinary explanation is found, the atheist worldview does not explain the facts on the ground as well as the theist, and hence is not to be preferred.

Again, as previously stated, the argument here is not that theism is the only possible rational conclusion to reach. The argument is that belief in a supernatural order is the more parsimonious assumption, hence more reasonable than disbelief.

About John C Wright

John C. Wright is a practicing philosopher, a retired attorney, newspaperman, and newspaper editor, and a published author of science fiction. Once a Houyhnhnm, he was expelled from the august ranks of purely rational beings when he fell in love; but retains an honorary title.

July 23, 2015 @ 4:17 am

Reasonings