Three relations of morality
There are but three possible moral standards a man can use towards another being.
First, he can treat the other being as a man, that is, as if the other is a free and adult human being, sound of mind, responsible for his deeds. This is the relationship of justice. When treating another man justly, one neither fails to reward what is praiseworthy with praise, nor fails to condemn what is blameworthy with blame. No excuses, no justifications, are requested or made.
Second, he can treat the other was a child, that is, someone who is not responsible for his actions, but who may learn to be responsible one day. This is the relationship of mercy, and it is a condescending relationship. Only someone in a position of strength and authority safely can show mercy to someone who petitions mercy. Mercy is shown, either out of charity and humanity, or from a hope that the child might learn, in time to come, to behave responsibly. It is hoped that the act of mercy will soften the child’s stubborn heart.
It should be noted that acts of mercy, when the mercy is repaid by contrition, makes for an inspiring tale in the fashion that grim justice does not. By the very nature of their practice, artists, poets, writers and playwrights are encouraged to praise the virtue of mercy beyond its due merit.
The tale where the boy removes a thorn from a lion’s paw, and is later eaten by the lion, is no very uplifting tale. Likewise, the tale where the death-row inmate is electrocuted for his crimes by an anonymous executioner is not as entertaining as one where he is shot during a running gun-fight with an heroic policeman; because a man shooting back, even a bad man, still shows admirable courage, and the chase still is exciting. In real life, however, given a choice, we would prefer criminals not to shoot back, and to be slain cleanly under the hands of an executioner who bears them no malice. The inspiring nature of tales of mercy convinces some men that justice is a vice, not a virtue, and that mercy will always have the benevolent effect that it has only in the rare cases that find their way into stories. Such men forget that stories are told only of extraordinary deeds, not or ordinary ones. Ordinarily, showing mercy to a criminal, or to an enemy, is tantamount to inviting further crimes and further attacks. Showing mercy to children aids their development into charitable and humane human beings.
Often a child misbehaves due to a lack of understanding, or a lack of wisdom. In such cases, sympathy and education can bestow adult understanding and wisdom on the child as he grows from youth to manhood.
Finally, he can treat the other as an animal, that is, a creature to whom the category of moral judgment does not apply. A dog can be a “good dog” or a “bad dog” as judged by it’s obedience to its master, it serviceability to human needs. A bloodhound is a “good dog” when it tracks who or what its master sets it to track. A “good” bloodhound is not condemned of moral wickedness merely because it tracks an innocent Jew escaping a Gulag; nor is it praised for moral goodness merely because it tracks a guilty murderer escaping a jail. The judgments was make about the instincts of animals are not moral judgments: at most, we might judge the trainer to be an efficient or inefficient trainer; we might say certain dogs or horses are ungovernable and useless, because they are too wild, or we might say they are gentle and come of good stock. In these cases, we are making observations about their nature, their spirit, or their training, and we call them “good” and “bad” as they are serviceable to human needs: but in no case will we be complimenting the nicety of the moral judgment of the animal.
Each of these three moral categories has its proper object. If a man commits a crime, and that man is sane and sober, it is proper to mete out the punishment that one equal metes out to another. If a child misbehaves, and the child lacks understanding, it is proper to educate the child. If an animals behaves in a fashion that this displeasing to its master, it is proper to domesticate and train the animal, if it can be trained; or otherwise to be rid of it: but in no case is there room for moral judgment.
When a man asks that a criminal be treated with loving education or “treatment” rather than with punishment, he asks that we treat our fellow man as a child. When a man asks that a criminal be excuse of all wrong because the criminal cannot help what he does, he asks that we treat our fellow man as an animal.
A man who asks us to condescend to our fellow man in this way often couches his plea in terms of showing respect to the fellow. In fact, the opposite is being asked of us. One can respect the moral judgment of a fellow adult who has come to a conclusion different from one’s own. A moral judgment can be a sober one, even if one does not share it. One cannot respect a childish folly or animal instict as being equal to sober moral judgment.
A man who excuses his own criminal behavior with the claim that he cannot control his own nature, is asking to be treated as something less than an animal, because he is asking that we excuse or ignore the behavior as being a product of unchangeable inner nature, but he is also asking that we do not domesticate and train that nature to be serviceable to his fellow man.
The application of this analysis to the current issues of the day should be clear. Those who wish to “treat” rather than punish crime condescend to criminals, treating them like children, and, of course, encourage them. Those who claim that sexual perversions are part of a pervert’s unchangeable nature condescend to the perverts in a fashion even more insulting, treating them like animals; and, at that, untamable animals, for the inner nature of the pervert, whatever psychopathology it is that drives them to their disgusting deeds, is regarded as being sacrosanct from any moral condemnation.
About John C Wright
John C. Wright is a practicing philosopher, a retired attorney, newspaperman, and newspaper editor, and a published author of science fiction. Once a Houyhnhnm, he was expelled from the august ranks of purely rational beings when he fell in love; but retains an honorary title.
