Additional Questions on the Question of Chastity
Part of an ongoing conversation. Dr. Rolf Andreassen, with whom we have been discussing the morality (or otherwise) of monogamy, makes the following comment. My questions below refer to this and also to previous comments by the good doctor. I solicit answers not just from him, but from any reader who cares to comment.
As for sex, I haven’t said it’s relative at all; I have merely said that I wish to draw the line in a different place from Mr Wright’s lifelong monogamy. The actual rule may still be absolute. However, since I do not have full knowledge of the morality, I’m much more inclined to let consenting adults work out their own damnation than I am when children, who cannot meaningfully consent, are involved.
You define two categories of moral behavior. The first category is known moral absolutes, such as the rule against child abuse. The second category includes those things where your lack of full knowledge inclines you to defer to the opinion of the individual involved. You imply that the lack of informed consent on the part of the child is one significant consideration.
If I have not misunderstood your position, the rule against child abuse is an absolute in your philosophy, but the rule against unchastity is a matter of opinion where reasonable men can differ.
Does neglect of a child one brings into the world constitute a known moral absolute (first category) or not (second category)? You affirm matters in the first category to be moral laws, but defer to the opinions of others in the second.
For example, while buckling a young child into a car seat is not necessarily assured of delivering him safe from car accidents, it is negligence to let the babe roll around in the legwell while driving on the Autobahn. Is this a case where a known principle of morality has been violated, or a case where each adult’s opinion is given deference?
For example, if one fathered a child without making any provision to educate the child, such as if I fathered a child on a woman of some remote tribe who had not discovered writing, in circumstances where I made no provision to see to it that the child got any schooling, would that constitute a violation of a known moral absolute on my part? Or would you defer to my opinion?
What if I were a rich and mighty lord who fathered a child on a poor and starving servant girl of eighteen years, and I make no provision for the paternity, care, housing, or feeding of the child? Is this neglect in the first category of morality (violation of a known principle) or the second (not necessarily a violation of a known principle)?
What if I fathered a child on a woman with whom I merely had an alliance of convenience, or an infatuation, and was not bound to her by any oath or affirmation of lifelong love and fidelity? Is failing to make prudent provision for a family for the child in the same category as failing to provide for the child’s education?
What if I fathered a bastard, and took no prudent provision to form a family unit, to bind the loyalty of the mother to the family, and did nothing to bind myself to the family I was creating other than rely on my own, and her, natural affections and inclinations? Would you defer to my opinion, or should the fact that a child is involved who cannot meaningfully consent change our moral calculus?
Should a father love his child?
Should a father love his child even before the child is born?
Should a father make prudent provision for the birth of his child?
What does prudence suggest is the healthiest and safest environment in which to raise a child? In a family, bound together for life by oath, love, law and custom, or in an open alliance of convenience bound together temporarily by natural affection?
About John C Wright
John C. Wright is a practicing philosopher, a retired attorney, newspaperman, and newspaper editor, and a published author of science fiction. Once a Houyhnhnm, he was expelled from the august ranks of purely rational beings when he fell in love; but retains an honorary title.
