Epistemology
A reader and I are revisiting an old, old dispute.
I said this:
The real meat of the question is what epistemology (that is, what theory of what constitutes a legitimate proof) can serve to prove or to disprove the existence of God, a being allegedly benevolent, omnipotent, simple, source and creator of the universe, and fundamental axiom of goodness and means by which goodness is known? Assuming someone posits the existence of such a supreme being, what type of proof is legitimate to prove or to disprove His existence?
If you answer that it is the same means we use to prove the rate of gravity on Earth, that answer is wrong, for the simple reason that weights would fall at the same rate whether the cosmos is a created artifact, or the accidental by-product of a blind natural process, or was created by a demiurge or some being lacking the properties under discussion. The one has nothing to do with the other.
His question in reply:
What type of proof is legitimate to prove or disprove the existence of a common ancestor of humans and apes? If you answer that it is the same means we use to prove the rate of gravity on Earth, that answer is wrong, for the simple reason that weights would fall at the same rate whether or not humans and apes have a common ancestor. Can you find the flaw in this reasoning?
I applaud your attempt to use the Socratic method! In that spirit I will answer any and all questions you put to me!
Only indirect yet empirical proof, the same as a detective might use to piece together from clues a crime scene for which there are no eyewitnesses, that is the legitimate means of proof to lend weight to the theory that men and apes arose from a common ancestor.
In such a case, the evidence which is best and most elegantly explained by the theory of common ancestry lends substance to the theory; anything that cannot be explained, or cannot be explained without ad hoc theorizing, subtracts substance to the theory.
In my opinion, the evidence of biology and paleontology lends considerable weight to the theory of a common ancestor, and the only questions subtracting weight from the theory are the lack of transitional forms or “missing links” in the fossil record, and the lack of a theorized mechanism to explain the genetic changes.
So, to sum up, it is an empirical question in the biological and paleontological fields .
You then say that the experiment used to measure the rate of gravity on Earth has no bearing on the theory of the common ancestor, but I am afraid I can only agree in a limited sense. It depends on the result of the experiment. For certain values of the acceleration of gravity, the model or world-picture of humans having a common ancestor with apes could make no sense. If it was discovered, to use a frivolous example, the Earth gained one second per second of acceleration once a century, then the Earth could be only sixteen centuries old, since before that the acceleration of gravity would be zero, and the oceans and airs all fly out into space.
But this is a frivolous example. For all reasonable values of gravity, the question of whether heavier bodies fall faster, while being an empirical question, has no direct bearing on whether humans and apes have a common ancestor.
The first is question addressed by the field of biology; the second by the field of astronomy. They are both empirical fields but they do not address the same issues.
Are you asking me to draw a distinction between the two cases? Two disciplines which do not share an epistemology or method of confirmation (metaphysics versus physics) are not the same as two fields within a discipline which do share epistemological methods but do not share subject matters (biological science versus astronomical science).
Is any argument aside from the statement as such needed?
I hope you are not arguing that, since biology and astronomy are distinct fields subsumed under the epistemology of empiricism, ergo physics and metaphysics are not distinct fields; or ergo metaphysics is an empirical discipline.
But I will grant you that my statement erred: it is not simply the case that the ontological argument for God is unrelated to the physical question of gravity shows that they have differing epistemological methods. I should have said that the methods, not the conclusions, of the one have no bearing on the other. I thank you for the correction.
I have answered your question. Now it is your turn to answer mine.
What epistemology (that is, what theory of what constitutes a legitimate proof) can serve to prove or to disprove the existence of God, a being allegedly benevolent, omnipotent, simple, source and creator of the universe, and fundamental axiom of goodness and means by which goodness is known? Assuming someone posits the existence of such a supreme being, what type of proof is legitimate to prove or to disprove this supreme being’s existence?
If you claim it is an empirical question, give an example of an empirical experiment or observation which would lend or subtract substance to the weight of evidence for or against the proposition?
About John C Wright
John C. Wright is a practicing philosopher, a retired attorney, newspaperman, and newspaper editor, and a published author of science fiction. Once a Houyhnhnm, he was expelled from the august ranks of purely rational beings when he fell in love; but retains an honorary title.
