John C. Wright's Journal

A continuation of a recent column:

When asked if there was an independent and objective ground for moral judgments, such as, for example, a condemnation of abducting another man’s wife, comments returned three types of replies, of which these below are typical.

The first:

There are many [objective grounds] aren’t there? The need for order. Help me overcome my despair for them. I might reward them. The reasoning I might roll out is endlessly diverse.

This and answers like it assumes the value of moral behavior without saying whence that value comes. It is merely not answering the question.

The second:

Morality is just our introspection of the goal-seeking behavior of the brain. We label paths toward a goal as “good” and paths away from a goal as “bad”. The state space for life is much, much greater than that of chess or Go, so we have to use heuristics to guide our choices. Evolutionary biology shows that nature has used the problem of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma in game theory to shape our brains. We have a “common objective morality” because our brains are similar.

Or, more verbosely:

Morality is an inherent and emergent property of the universe in the same way that gravity is; theoretically equally mathematically modelable and predictable, based on long-term benefit relationships of the sort analyzed (on a very basic level) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma – relationships whose nature and outcomes are as inextricable from the overall structure of this universe as any merely physical interaction. When you feel something is “just wrong”, it’s because it’s written into your DNA to react that way because timeless experience has shown that whatever-it-is should be reacted to in that manner because if you don’t have that reaction it will be the worse for you and those like you over time, in the same way that fear of heights is not really irrational.

This and answers like it assumes that identifying an instinct or genetic compulsion to perform a behavior is the same as saying the behavior is valuable, without saying whence that value comes. It is speaking on an irrelevant topic, the historical cause of the desire for morality, without addressing the question of the formal or final cause of morality, that is, without saying why morality is objective, or what morality is for. It ignores the question while pretending to answer it.

It is also scientific gibberish. When some scientists isolates the ‘evil’ gene, then is the time to assert that moral judgments and legal reasoning principles are somehow ‘written’ into our DNA.

Until then, one might as well say your moral judgments are due to the influence of Jupiter ascending in Libra at the hour of your birth. If you are going to believe in magic, at least have the dignity to bow to stars and shining planets rather than bow to sperm.

And, far less reasonable, the third:

“My aversion to kidnapping women is simply a brute fact about who and how I am. I don’t like people who kidnap women; I would enjoy doing violence to them.”

This and answers like it takes morality as a given, and ignores the question with a show of grand disdain, as if a lack of curiosity about these paramount issues was praiseworthy rather than shameful.

Now, my argument, for those who care to understand what is actually being said, is that atheists can give no coherent reason to support a belief in an objective moral order to the universe, a law binding on all rational beings.

Let us use a simple example. A Martian from the movie MARS NEEDS WOMEN kidnaps the lovely Yvonne Craig.

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• Montague posted on June 25, 2014
  "Mr. Wright, you heartless monster! Please don’t toss me into the Agony Vat with the materialists!" I see that the…
• gbaker posted on June 3, 2014
  "I already said that if you want to talk philosophy with me, you have to use words and ideas as…
• John C Wright posted on June 3, 2014
  My move is to say, 'Good day to you, sir.' The matter is closed.

Concerning my column at EveryJoe, which holds that atheists, while being personally moral or not as their nature and consciences direct, are unable to account for the universality of the moral code, a reader with counterfeit name of False Keraptis asked the following:

I’m both an atheist and a believer in objective morality. How is this possible? Well, I’d say objective mortality comes from two sources: reason and instinct.

First, reason: by thinking logically and rigorously, we can determine the optimal way for rational agents to interact with each other. Game theory, and especially the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, are the best and most promising efforts I’ve seen in this area, and while they’re valuable and inspiring, I admit, they’re woefully incomplete. However, it’s not unreasonable to think that there exists a larger body of objective morality that we haven’t yet discovered or described, but which we intuitively grasp, just as someone ignorant of Euclid’s methods might still have good spatial intuition.

Secondly, even though we have not fully described or discovered objective morality, the laboratory of evolution has given us instinctual insight into it through millennia of trial and error. If there does exist an optimal way for humans to interact with each other, and there seems to, then generation upon generation of life in social groups will have equipped us with a sense of morality that at least approximates it.

Now, one might object that I haven’t explained morality, but rather some vague idea of optimal behavior to maximize an equally vague combination self-interest and the group’s interest. I would say that’s exactly what morality is. All humans feel and respect the same moral rules because we have the same instincts, honed to make us follow a standard of behavior that gave our ancestors success. Further, because natural selection is patient and powerful, I would argue that these instincts come ever closer to the objectively optimal way for us to interact with one another.

My comment: I was also an atheist and a believer in objective morality when I was an atheist. My argument was very similar to yours. I would raise three questions:

First, is morality universal? By ‘universal’ I mean that there is a moral code whose imperatives, maxims, or commands have authority over all rational beings, everywhere and at all times (leaving aside for the moment whether there are times when one imperative overrules another). Because my argument is not that there are not moral atheists; nor do I argue that atheists are not prudent nor law abiding. My argument is that if there is a universal morality, atheists cannot account for it.

I would argue that a moral rule is not a moral rule if it is not universal, for the same reason that a rule of logic (such as ‘A is A’) is not a rule of logic if it is not universal. If we can find a time or a place where ‘A is A’ is not true and not valid, then it is not a rule properly so called: it is nothing more than a convenient convention, a custom, or a habit of thought that is sometimes true and sometimes not. It is a rule of grammar.

Second, if one source of morality is the game theory of optimizing behavior, then what authority does optimal behavior have over my conscience? If moral rules are merely my selfish desires seeking an optimally efficient method of satisfaction, then what motive, aside from a selfish one, prompts me to be concerned with the good of the group? If moral rules are merely my selfish desires seeking an optimally efficient method of satisfaction, then under what circumstances would I commit an act of self sacrifice for preserving my wife, children, city, nation, cause or church? Are we defining ‘morality’ such that self sacrifice is never permitted, never compelled?

Third, if the other source of morality is instinct brought about by trial and error, then what authority can possibility forbid me from making the error? Making the error is a beneficial part of the process of discovery. If our moral code is an approximation based on generally successful strategies, how do I know whether my particular tactical decision here and now falls within the approximation?

Let me use an example of a particular tactical decision: If I am in a war, generally one should not outrun one’s own supply lines; and yet if I am in the position to outflank the Maginot Line, rushing forward beyond my supply lines may be the wise course in this one instance even if it is not generally prudent. And even if it does not fall within this approximation, what authority does this blindly evolved approximation have over me?

What, if any, reason aside from a prudential regard for my own self interest imposes a duty that should I conform my behavior to this standard? You seem to be describing the mere opposite of duty.

You seem to be making the claim that this particular moral lapse is not likely to conduce to my long term pleasure and happiness. But what authority does long term pleasure and happiness have over me? Why is the authority of short term happiness not as great or, because the future is uncertain and man is mortal, greater?

Allow me to explain why I am asking about authority. Let us take a real-make believe case to make this point clear:

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• Rolf Andreassen posted on June 4, 2014
  Could you use a different term than algorithm to explain what you mean? Function, procedure, transform, method of calculation? One…
• Sylvie D. Rousseau posted on June 3, 2014
  Montague said: "The Good is the axiom of ethics, and theology (not to mention philosophy) declare that The Good is…
• Mary posted on June 1, 2014
  We're not discussing what I have in mind; we're discussing what you have in mind as shown by the mystical…

This is a column published in this space two years ago, reprinted at the request of a reader who wanted to see it again.

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Sean M. Brooks writes and asks:

In debates or discussions with other online friends, I’ve been told that “opinions” cannot be wrong, false, mistaken, erroneous, etc. My reaction was to argue this did not make sense. It could be my opinion that 2 + 2 = 5 or that Hitler was a noble, wise, saintly, and holy man. Are these “opinions” truly not wrong or false?

One person did concede an opinion can be factually wrong while still arguing opinions cannot be wrong. This did not make sense to me–and I rejected it as self contradictory.

If this interests you, do you have any comments to make? Am I wrong to say opinions can be erroneous or false? Am I missing something?

The short answer is that you are right and they are wrong, because if no opinions can be false or mistaken, then my opinion that some or all opinions can be false and mistaken cannot be false nor mistaken.

The long answer is more subtle: it depends on the meaning of the word “opinion”.

The longest and best answer requires a few paragraphs on the nature of human knowledge, and requires we draw some distinctions.
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• Sean Michael posted on May 30, 2014
  The reason why I requested Mr. Wright to repost this essay of his was my exasperation at yet again having…
• megadunsparce posted on May 28, 2014
  I can certainly understand the train of thought. I would not consider a claim that Santa Claus was real nor…
• Sean Michael posted on May 28, 2014
  Dear ConceptJunkie: I like your suggestion on how to rebut a person who denies any opinion can be wrong or…