A longtime reader with the latinate yet indecipherable name of Nostreculsus (and with the truly awesome icon of a chinaman who eats with sticks once seen on Mulberry Street, but no longer) writes and asks:
At the grave risk of revealing my appalling ignorance and the ignorance of my fellow moderns, I confess that I was lost on reading the very first sentence. Namely, I don’t understand what is this “substance” of which you speak.
Naturally, I tried looking up the word. Wikipedia writes “Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it” and goes on from there to describe theories of one, two or many substances.
Physics nowadays dispenses entirely with the concept, unless it is expressed by another word. Is “substance” the same as the state of a system and “properties” another word for observables?
The answer is no. “Substance” as the term in used in ontology, is not “the state of a system” as that phrase is used in that branch of natural philosophy called physics, nor is the term “properties” in ontology another word for “observables” in physics. The concepts are quite different.
And you venture no risk. A call to define one’s terms is always in order.
The term “substance” in philosophy is a term of art. It hardly a matter of ignorance, and certainly not an appalling ignorance, not to know a technical term from a field in which one is not trained. Please voice no qualms for asking a question: I love questions.
The Wikipedia definition is correct as it stands, if worded elliptically.
The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means ‘being’, or in Latin substantia, which literally means ‘foundation’ or ‘what stands beneath.’ The branch of philosophy examining claims about substances is called ‘ontology.’
A ‘substance’ is the foundation or fundamental being of reality. It is the thing that cannot be reduced to a simpler thing.
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